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Abstract
Adversarial attacks have exposed a significant security vulnerability in state-of-the-
art machine learning models. Among these models include deep reinforcement
learning agents. The existing methods for attacking reinforcement learning agents
assume the adversary either has access to the target agent’s learned parameters or
the environment that the agent interacts with. In this work, we propose a new class
of threat models, called snooping threat models, that are unique to reinforcement
learning. In these snooping threat models, the adversary does not have the ability
to personally interact with the environment, and can only eavesdrop on the action
and reward signals being exchanged between agent and environment. We show
that adversaries operating in these highly constrained threat models can still launch
devastating attacks against the target agent by training proxy models on related
tasks and leveraging the transferability of adversarial examples.
1 Introduction
The deep learning revolution has put neural networks at the forefront of the machine learning research
and production landscape. Recently, it has been shown that deep neural networks (DNNs) are effective
function approximators for solving complex reinforcement learning (RL) problems. Mnih et al. [20]
demonstrated that we can leverage the feature extraction capabilities of convolutional neural networks
to enable RL agents to learn to play Atari games from raw pixels. Since then, there has been an
influx of work dedicated to the field of deep RL (DRL), enabling powerful new solutions for tasks
such as game playing [20, 22, 34, 31], continuous control [17, 32, 33], complex robot manipulation
[16, 29, 27], and even autonomous vehicle operation [4, 30].
Despite the numerous successes of the applications of deep neural networks, these models have a
significant Achilles’ heel. Studies show that these largely uninterpretable models are vulnerable to
small adversarial perturbations to the input that cause the models to perform poorly [36, 10]. Recent
work has uncovered a variety of adversarial attack algorithms in the domain of image classification
[10, 6, 24, 8]. Alarmingly, results show that adversarial examples effective against one model are
also effective against other models trained on the same task [10]. This transferability property has
enabled attacks against models in black-box settings [25, 13].
As of now, adversarial attacks against DRL agents primarily consider the white-box threat model, in
which the adversary is assumed to have access to the target model’s architecture and parameters. To
our knowledge, the study of black-box attacks against DRL has been limited to the acknowledgement
of the transferability of adversarial examples across policies and algorithms [12]. Thus, the current
method for black-box attacks against DRL agents involves training a surrogate agent, which makes
the rather unrealistic assumption that the adversary has unbounded access to the environment. In
general, the black-box threat model in RL is more complex than it is in supervised learning. First, in
the data generating process for supervised learning, the model draw samples i.i.d. from a static dataset.
In RL, data generation is in the form of an environment from which new data samples are conditioned
on the current environment state and the agent’s actions. This means that an RL adversary cannot
trivially approximate the training data generating process the way a supervised learning adversary
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can. Also, the RL problem consists of an exchange of a three signals between the environment and
agent (state, action, reward). Even if an RL adversary seeks to approximate the agent or environment
using some other method (e.g. inverse RL), they would need access to all signals.
In this work, we investigate threat models for DRL under the assumption that the adversary does
not have access to the environment that the target agent interacts with. Specifically, we explore
the potential effectiveness of an adversary that only has the ability to eavesdrop on a subset of the
RL signals at each time step. We dub these the snooping threat models. We show that by training
proxy models on tasks similar to the target agent’s task, we are able to craft adversarial inputs that
significantly reduce the performance of target agents trained on various Atari environments. We feel
this to be a more practical threat model for real-world systems. Overall, the contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows:
• We define the complex threat model for snooping attacks on DRL agents.
• We propose the use of proxy models for launching effective adversarial attacks under the
different snooping threat models.
• We conduct extensive experiments using the attacks against the state-of-the-art DRL algo-
rithms DQN [20] and PPO [32].
• We empirically show that adversarial examples transfer between models that are trained
with very different objectives as long as the tasks are related.
2 Related work
Adversarial machine learning is a research area that investigates the vulnerabilities of deep neural
networks to small adversarial perturbations. In this work, we focus on evasion attacks, which are test-
time attacks designed to fool a trained model. This topic was popularized in the image classification
domain in the white-box setting, where Szegedy et al. [36] discovered that adding imperceptible
noise to an image causes the model to predict the incorrect class with high confidence. Goodfellow
et al. [10] followed by suggesting a fast gradient method for crafting adversarial examples in an
inexpensive way by assuming local linearity in the target model. [10] also observed that adversarial
examples crafted using the gradients of one model transfer to other models trained on the same
task. Papernot et al. [25] leveraged this concept of transferability and introduced a framework for
black-box attacks that uses the target model as an oracle to train a surrogate model with a similar
decision surface, and uses the surrogate to craft adversarial examples that also fool the target.
In the DRL domain, Huang et al. [12] showed that the fast gradient method [10] can be extended to
fool agents on the Atari benchmark. Lin et al. [18] introduced a strategically-timed attack, which
seeks to make perturbations sparse in time to render them more difficult to detect. [18] further
presented an enchanting attack that strives to lure the target agent into a specified state. Behzadan and
Munir [1] demonstrated that adversarial examples can be used during training to corrupt the learning
process of an agent on the Atari Pong environment. Adversarial examples have also been used for
hardening DRL models to environmental parameter variations in continuous control environments
[28]. Overall, adversarial attacks on DRL agents have primarily been limited to the white-box setting.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Adversarial example crafting
The goal of adversarial example crafting is to apply an imperceptible perturbation to a benign input
such that the perturbed input fools the target model. In this work, we consider variants of the Fast
Gradient Method (FGM) [10] because it is computationally efficient and generalizes to models other
than classifiers. FGM is a one-step method that assumes linearity of the decision surface around a
given sample. With this assumption, the optimal perturbation for an input x is in the direction to
maximize the loss J . We consider constraining the perturbations under the L∞ and L2 norm bounds.
Under the L∞ norm bound ‖x∗ − x‖∞ ≤ , an adversarial example x∗ is generated as
x∗ = x+  ∗ sign(∇xJ(x, y)) (1)
2
where y is the label. Under the L2 norm bound ‖x∗ − x‖2 ≤ , x∗ is generated as
x∗ = x+  ∗ ∇xJ(x, y)‖∇xJ(x, y)‖2
. (2)
We also consider a momentum iterative variant of FGM (MIFGM) introduced by Dong et al. [8].
This variant disregards the linearity assumption and iteratively perturbs while accumulating a velocity
vector in the direction of the gradient to stabilize the perturbation direction and combat overfitting.
Figure 1: Adversarial example comparison between FGM attacks under different norm constraints on
the Pong environment. The L∞ bounded example was crafted with  = 0.03 and the L2 bounded
example used  = 2.4. These examples were crafted using the psychic proxy model (see 5.2).
3.2 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement Learning is a machine learning paradigm based on sequential interactions between
an agent and an environment in which the agent attempts to learn a policy pi to maximize a total
reward [35]. This interaction is formalized as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which is the tuple
〈S,A,P,R, γ〉. S is a finite set of states,A is a finite set of actions, P(s, a, s′) = P (St+1 = s′|St =
s,At = a) is the state transition function,R(s, a) = E[Rt+1|St = s,At = a] is the reward function
and γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor. The interaction can be described as follows: At each time step t,
the environment sends a state st to the agent. The agent decides on an action at and dispatches it
back to the environment. The environment responds by sending a reward rt+1 to the agent along with
the next state st+1, and the process repeats. In this work, we consider the state-of-the-art value-based
DRL method DQN [20] and policy-based PPO [32]. See Appendix for descriptions of these methods.
4 Snooping threat models
A high level view of the snooping threat model for DRL is portrayed in Figure 2. As in any threat
model, we assume the adversary can intercept and manipulate the input game frames (i.e. the state).
In the snooping family of threat models, the adversary does not have direct access to the environment,
so training a surrogate DRL model and transferring examples from the surrogate to the target is
ruled out. Instead, the adversary can only "snoop", or eavesdrop, on the natural interactions between
the agent and environment. We define the SRA threat model to represent the scenario in which the
adversary can snoop on reward and action signals, SA for when the adversary can only snoop on the
actions, SR for when the adversary can only snoop on the rewards, and S for when the adversary
only has access to the states. When the reward signal is hidden, the adversary is assumed to have no
inclination about the goal of the agent. In the general case of game environments, this means that
the adversary cannot explicitly infer the difference between winning and losing. When the action
signal is hidden, not only is the adversary unable to determine which actions correspond to certain
changes in the state space, but there is also no way of explicitly knowing the scope and magnitude of
the action space at all.
5 Attack strategies
5.1 Methodology
Our general attack methodology is to leverage the transferability of adversarial examples. While
this concept is not fully understood, recent efforts show that transferability is primarily enabled by
decision boundary similarity between models [37, 36, 19]. We argue that this condition, however,
generally overestimates the resources necessary to craft effective transferable adversarial examples.
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Figure 2: Snooping threat model overview for DRL.
The snooping threat models for RL provides one such counterexample, in which the adversary cannot
train a surrogate DRL model that closely resembles the target agent. Instead, we posit that if the
adversary can train a proxy model that learns a task that is related to the target agent’s policy to
maximize reward, adversarial examples crafted to fool the proxy will also fool the agent. This implies
that even proxy models with radically different decision surface dimensionality than the target can
reliably produce transferable attacks. We hypothesize that by learning a related task, the proxy will
learn to extract and use input features in a similar fashion to the target agent, which is the only
necessary condition for crafting transferable attacks. Our explicit goal is to train a proxy model
M under a constraint subset κ ∈ {S, SR, SA, SRA} parameterized by θMκ with loss JMκ that
extracts similar input features and learns comparable implications of these features to the target agent
T parameterized by θT trained with loss JT (e.g. temporal difference error). Using input gradients
as an indication of feature saliency, our intention is to train a constrained proxyMκ to optimize:
argmin
Mκ
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
∇xJMκ(θMκ , xi, yi)− c∇xJT (θT , xi, zi)
)]
(3)
where N is an arbitrary number of inputs, xi is an input, yi is the true label for the proxy, zi is
the pseudo-true label [12] for the agent, and c is an unknown constant. We include c as a scaling
constant as we desireMκ to produce similarly shaped input gradients to T ’s, meaning the magnitude
of the gradients do not necessarily have to align exactly. Note that this objective is a theoretical
representation, and does not represent a tractable optimization objective. The exact choice of task and
proxyMκ is determined by our discretion. Also note that since we are attacking RL agents during
test time, we will not have access to truth labels required by the FGM method (i.e. the y in Equations
1 and 2), as RL data is inherently unlabeled. To work around this, we follow [12] and assume that our
surrogates and proxies have converged to a reasonable minima, so we use their outputs as "truth".
For surrogate agents or classifier proxies, we use the one-hot output of the model as truth, and for
regressor proxies, we use the output (plus a small constant)1 as truth.
5.2 S threat model
The S threat model is the weakest snooping threat model. The adversary only has access to a stream
of states, and has no inclination about the motivations or capabilities of the agent. In this case, we
propose a proxy MS that models the environment dynamics. Previous work shows that we can
perform accurate next-frame prediction using the current state, action, and an L2 reconstruction
loss as long as P is roughly deterministic [23, 38, 15]. This model directly approximates the state
transition distribution P(s, a, s′). In S however, we do not have access to A, so the best we can do is
approximate an expectation of P under the target agent’s policy piT using a psychic proxy model:
psychic(st, θP ) ≈ EpiT [P (st+1|st)] = Eat∼piT [P (st+1|st, at)]. (4)
Because the psychic learns the dynamics P under piT , it effectively learns an encoding of piT in the
state space. In other words, the displacement of the agent’s representation in the state space (e.g. the
1We must add a small constant to avoid computing a loss of zero.
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Figure 3: Comparison of features learned by target agent, surrogate agent, and proxy models on
Seaquest environment using perturbation-based saliency map visualizations [11].
pixels of the paddle in Breakout) from st to st+1 inherently encodes a representation of the action at
taken and therefore an instance of the agent’s policy piT (st). This approximation will be noisy in
general due to displacements in the state space that are not the consequence of the agent’s actions
(e.g. the movement of the fish in Seaquest). Despite the noisiness, the key is that a subset of the
features learned by the psychic will be similar to the features learned by the target agent.
5.3 SR threat model
In the SR threat model, we can intercept the states and snoop on the rewards. Because we do not
have access to the actions, we again cannot make any presumptions about the policy piT directly.
However, by observing the rewards resulting from each state in a rollout we can get insight into the
agent’s motivations by training an assessor proxy to estimate the value V of a given state under piT .
Since the reward signal is what drives the policy piT , the features learned to approximate V piT must
correspond to the features used by the agent itself.
assessor(st, θA) ≈ EpiT
[∑∞
k=0
γ
(k)
t rt+k+1
]
= V piT (st) (5)
In our study we use empirical return to estimate value, meaning that we observe the immediate
rewards at each step, and when the episode is over we retroactively calculate the (standardized)
discounted sum of rewards at each state. During training, the assessor minimizes a Huber regression
objective [9] between predicted value and empirical value. Despite the fact that the JMSR objective is
different than JT , the task of approximating V piT is directly related to piT . For example, value-based
agents directly approximate a value estimate QpiT (st, piT (st)) = V piT (st), and for policy-based
agents, the explicit goal of the resulting policy is to maximize return, so implicitly the agent learns to
assess the value of states.
5.4 SA threat model
In the SA threat model, we have access to a stream of states and can snoop on the actions taken by
the agent at each step. Therefore, approximating piT can be done directly with supervised learning.
We can train an imitator model to predict the action that the target will take at a given state as:
imitator(st, θI) ≈ piT (st). (6)
Since the imitator is a classifier, we train it with cross-entropy loss (JMSA ) using the agent’s actions
as labels. Although the imitator is trained with a different objective, it is directly related to the
target agent’s goal. For value-based agents, the policy pi is an -greedy extension of the learned
Q-function and for policy-based agents, the function piT is directly approximated. This methodology
is homologous to the black-box attack strategy in [25], in which a substitute model is trained using
the target model as an oracle. Note that if we were to have a continuous action space, the imitator
would simply become a regression model.
5.5 SRA threat model
When we have the ability to eavesdrop on rewards and actions, we can attack with an imitator, assessor,
or psychic. However, with this additional information we can improve our attacks by strategically
timing the perturbations to make them less detectable. Lin et al. [18] show that we can accomplish
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Figure 4: The effect of uniform random noise on trained agent performance. BASE agents are trained
without noise and AUG agents are trained with noise. Rewards are averages over 10 episodes.
this in a white-box setting by defining a preference function c(st) = maxat [Softmax(Q(st, at))]−
minat [Softmax(Q(st, at))] and attacking when c(s) ≥ β for some threshold β. At first glance, it
may seem possible to use a similar preference-based approach with our imitator or assessor models.
However, these proxies are only ever exposed to one particular policy piT during training, so they lack
the ability to assign credit to certain states or actions from the delayed reward signal. The RL agent, by
contrast, learns this credit assignment through repeated trial and error during training. Nevertheless,
we can approximate this ability using a combination of an assessor and an action-conditioned psychic
(AC-psychic), which predicts st+1 given st and at [38]. To perform the attack, we use the AC-psychic
to generate a hypothetical next-state for every action given the current state, and value each of these
with the assessor. We define a preference function whose output increases as the variation of potential
future reward increases. In other words, we want to perturb st when there is a large difference in the
different hypothetical values V piT (sHt+1). To craft the perturbations, we can chooseMSRA to be the
proxy model of our choice (i.e.MS ,MSR, orMSA). For details, see Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Strategically-timed snooping attack
Input: Trained assessor, trained AC-psychic, trained proxyMκ, trained target agent T , β
for t = 1, T do
Initialize empty list q;
foreach a ∈ A do
Predict sHt+1 with AC-psychic(st, a); . Generate hypothetical next-state
Estimate V H with assessor(sHt+1); . Value the hypothetical next-state
Append V H to q;
end
c(st) = max
[
Softmax(q)
]−min [Softmax(q)]; . Compute preference
if c(st) ≥ β then
Perturb st using ∇xJMκ ; . Attack if preference exceeds a threshold
end
Feed st to target T for action decision;
end
6 Experiments and analysis
Although previous work has shown that DRL agents are vulnerable to adversarial noise, to our
knowledge it is not clear whether it is the adversarial nature of the noise or simply the presence of
noise that causes the agents to fail. Figure 4 shows that small uniform random noise significantly
impacts agent performance. We believe that this fragility is due to the narrow training data distribution.
Atari frames do not naturally contain the noise, occlusion, or lighting variations that natural images
do, which leads to a higher risk of overfitting. In the interest of proving that our attacks are effective
due to transferability between proxy and agent, for the remainder of the work we only consider agents
that are hardened with uniform random noise perturbations during training. Our experiments show
that this produces more robust models while not significantly reducing clean data performance.
To test the effectiveness of the attacks outlined in Section 5, we average the total reward accumulated
by the target agent over 10 episodes of states perturbed by the FGM or MIFGM attacks at every time
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Figure 5: Performance reduction of DQN agents due to L∞ and L2 bounded perturbations. The black
dotted line represents a random-guess policy.
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Figure 6: Performance reduction of PPO agents due to L∞ and L2 bounded perturbations. The black
dotted line represents a random-guess policy.
step (using the proxy gradients ∇xJMκ). We repeat this on each game for five  values (i.e. attack
strengths). For an upper-bound baseline attack, we use the policy-transfer methodology proven to be
effective in [12] that assumes the adversary can train an identical model to the target agent, and use
this model as a surrogate for crafting transferable adversarial examples. Figures 5 and 6 show the
effectiveness of the transferred adversarial examples on the DQN and PPO agents, respectively. Note
that the Appendix contains figures showing the attack success rates over time steps.
The imitators produce the most effective attacks out of the proxy models, performing comparably to
the surrogate in all games. We believe this is because these models represent the most direct proxy to
the agent’s policy piT . The assessor attacks generally require a higher  to reach the performance of
the baseline and imitator attacks. Work by Tramèr et al. [37] gives the insight that better performing
models yield more transferable adversarial examples. We therefore hypothesize that the reason for
the lower performance of the assessor attacks is because the task of predicting the exact floating
point value of a given state is a difficult objective to approximate precisely given the sparsity and
variance of the reward signals. The attacks from the psychics perform worse than the surrogate and
imitator attacks in general. This is not surprising, as the psychics operate under the most difficult
threat model. In essence, the psychic model learns a noisy encoding of what the imitator learns
directly. In some environments, the psychic attacks are more effective than the assessor attacks. This
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Figure 7: Effectiveness of strategically-timed attacks on DQN agents over 30,000 time steps. Our
ACP+Assessor method and the random baseline use imitator gradients. We also compare to the
technique in [18], which uses the stronger surrogate gradients. The FGM method is used for crafting.
result further supports our hypothesis that proxy models that approximate the policy directly will
yield more transferable attacks.
To qualitatively evaluate the features that these models learn, we create perturbation-based saliency
maps [11] designed to be human interpretable visualizations of∇xJ(θ, xi, yi) on Atari games. Figure
3 shows a representative example of what the saliency maps tell us about these models. As expected,
the surrogate model’s map is very similar to the target’s. The imitator’s salient regions tend to be
the most similar to the target’s out of the proxy models, which further supports our beliefs regarding
attack effectiveness. The assessor tends to focus less on the agent itself (i.e. the submarine), and
more on the objects around it which correspond to potential future reward. This intuition also helps to
explain the inferior performance of the assessor’s attacks. Finally, because the psychic model predicts
the entire next-frame, it must attend to any object in the state space that moves. Because the psychic
learns an approximation of the state transition dynamics, a subset of the features that it learns (e.g.
the submarine, fish, divers) do correspond to features that are important to the agent’s policy.
The results of the strategically-timed snooping attack on DQN agents can be seen in Figure 7. Note
that we use the FGM crafting method with imitator gradients in this experiment. We compare this
performance to (1) the black-box variant of the original strategically-timed attack described in [18]
using FGM with surrogate gradients, and (2) an attack which perturbs at random time steps with
FGM and imitator gradients. The strategically-timed attacks will typically be more effective on the
paddle-based games such as Pong, as there is a clear distinction between time steps that are critical for
good performance (i.e. as the ball approaches the paddle) and time steps when the actions of the agent
do not matter. As expected, our method does not perform as well as the surrogate that was trained to
assign credit to certain states and actions. Our method does show promise, however, as it performs
markedly better than the random strategy without requiring any interaction with the environment. We
believe that our method’s effectiveness is bottlenecked by the high-variance assessor predictions, and
reducing the variance of the reward signal learned would lead to better performance.
An unexpected result of our experiments is the unimpressive performance of MIFGM compared to
vanilla FGM. To understand why, we consider that iterative attacks like MIFGM create a more custom
perturbation for the model that it is crafted by. This introduces the possibility that the resulting
adversarial examples are overfit to a local maxima of the white-box model. In the case of the the
proxy models, we posit that because of the significant differences in the loss functions used by the
agents and the proxies, adversarial examples that are more tailored to a specific objective will not
perform as well. In the case of the baseline surrogate agents that do use the same objectives, the high
variance of the RL data generation process is more likely to yield models with differently-shaped
decision surfaces compared to supervised classifiers that draw data i.i.d. Again, this renders the more
tailored perturbations less beneficial for transfer-based attacks.
7 Conclusions
It is often infeasible for an adversary to have access to a target agent’s parameters or train a DRL
surrogate agent on a proprietary environment. However, we show that an adversary only needs the
ability to intercept the states and optionally snoop on the action and reward signals to launch powerful
adversarial attacks on a black-box agent. We believe this to be an important security vulnerability to
consider and defend against before deploying these models to systems that we trust.
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A Deep reinforcement learning method descriptions
A.1 Deep Q-Networks
Q-learning is a value-based RL algorithm that estimates the cumulative discounted reward of each
state-action pair, and chooses its policy based on these estimated returns. In Q-learning, we approxi-
mate the function Q∗(s, a), which gives the cumulative discounted reward for taking action a in state
s, and following an optimal policy pi∗ thereafter [39]. To train, we iteratively optimize with a temporal
difference loss based on the Bellman equation [3]. Once we have an acceptable approximation of
Q∗, a common policy is to act -greedily to aid in exploration. In an effort to apply Q-learning to
problems with large state spaces such as Atari games, Mnih et al. [20] combine convolutional neural
networks with Q-learning to create deep Q-learning. In practice, this requires the use of a replay
memory buffer to enable off-policy learning and a target network for more stable updates.
A.2 Proximal policy optimization
PPO [32] is a policy-based RL method, meaning that it directly approximates the policy piθ(a|s)
with a neural network with parameters θ. The algorithm is typically implemented in an actor-critic
framework which simultaneously learns to approximate a variance-reduced advantage estimate to
stabilize the policy gradient. At each training step, PPO alternates between (1) collecting experience
by running the current policy for a set number of time steps, (2) computing empirical returns and
advantages, and (3) using batch learning to optimize a clipped surrogate objective that constrains the
amount the updated policy can differ from the old policy.
B Implementation details
B.1 Agents
We train DQN [20] and PPO [32] agents on Pong, Breakout, Space Invaders, and Seaquest games in
the Atari 2600 Arcade Learning Environment [2] via OpenAI Gym [5]. Preprocessing is primarily
facilitated using the Atari wrappers in OpenAI’s baselines library [7], which converts frames from
RGB to grayscale [0, 1], and resizes frames to 84x84. To make the environment Markovian, a state is
created by stacking the last four consecutive frames, making the input volume to the models of shape
4x84x84. We use the PyTorch deep learning framework [26], the DQN implementation described in
[21], and Ilya Kostrikov’s implementation of PPO [14].
B.2 Proxies
For the psychic and AC-psychic, we use a scaled-down implementation of the architecture described
in [38], as they work with the raw RGB frames and we predict the preprocessed version of the frames.
The imitator architecture that we use is identical to the smaller DQN that was initially introduced
in [20], and apply a Softmax operation to the logits for use with the cross-entropy classification
loss. Note that we intentionally use a different architecture from the target agents in the interest of
strictly adhering to black-box assumptions. The assessor uses the same architecture as the imitator,
but we replace the classification layer with a single output node, and train the model with the Huber
regression loss [9]. To train these models, we alternate between (1) collecting a pool of states and
"labels" using the signals that we are intercepting, and (2) running N iterations of optimization on
the pooled data.
C More results
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Figure 8: Attack success rates over 10 episodes of time steps on DQN agents due to L∞ and L2
bounded perturbations.
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Figure 9: Attack success rates over 10 episodes of time steps on PPO agents due to L∞ and L2
bounded perturbations.
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Figure 10: Effectiveness of strategically-timed attacks on PPO agents over 30,000 time steps. Our
ACP+Assessor method and the random baseline use imitator gradients. We also compare to the
technique in [18], which uses the stronger surrogate gradients. The FGM method is used for crafting.
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